Close Reading: "Internet Access is a Fundamental Right. Especially, Amidst a Pandemic."

The 2020 article "Internet Access is a Fundamental Right. Especially, Amidst a Pandemic" by Spyros Kasapis makes a compelling case for internet connection as a basic human right, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article, which was published by the Institute for Internet and the Just Society, emphasises how the pandemic has made digital inequality worse while expanding on the conversation already taking place around digital rights. This close reading examines the structure, reasoning, rhetorical devices, theoretical foundations, and limitations of the article, while also placing it within larger academic discussions concerning social justice and digital rights.

Summary & Structure

Using Salvador Allende's claim that happiness is a human right and relating it to internet access as equally essential, the article opens with a philosophical framework. Kasapis points out the Indian Supreme Court's 2020 ruling that internet access is a fundamental right, as well as the institutional recognition of internet access as a right by the UN and Amnesty International. This introduction sets precedents for his argument in both philosophy and law.

The article's main focus is on how the COVID-19 pandemic brought attention to already-existing socioeconomic injustices, especially the digital gap. According to Kasapis (2020), the pandemic's social distancing regulations increased the digitisation of commercial and educational activities, hence preventing people without internet connection from engaging in these essential areas. He argues that this exclusion is an example of inequality that exacerbates already-existing economic inequalities.

Kasapis (2020) presents his call to action in the last section with two questions: 1) Should governments make sure that everyone, regardless of money, has access to the internet? 2) Who should create the regulations that should control the internet? The Institute's dedication to guaranteeing "a fair and democratic digital society through a framework of rules and ideas, always guided by human rights" is what he says in closing.

Methodology and Approach

Instead of using practical methodology, Kasapis mostly uses philosophical and rights-based argumentation. His strategy consists of: establishing past decisions by citing reputable sources (such as the Indian Supreme Court, Amnesty International, and the United Nations), using the pandemic as an example to highlight the negative effects of digital exclusion, presenting inequality in the digital sphere as a continuation of economic disparity, and using rhetorical questions to get readers to think about the policy implications.

This strategy restricts the article's empirical basis while enabling Kasapis to present a strong moral case. The article falls short of comparative analysis of various policy measures to tackling digital sectionides, specific economic implications of digital exclusion during the pandemic, and statistical facts regarding internet access rates.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

By relating internet access to established rights like economic participation and education, Kasapis skilfully situates it within a larger human rights context and narrative. This claim and stance are consistent with academic research such as that of Mossberger et al. (2008), who contend that "digital citizenship" is now necessary for complete social engagement. His claim/argument is given immediate significance and urgency by the article's time, which coincides with the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic did, in fact, worsen digital inequality, as researchers like Beaunoyer et al. (2020) have since shown, with notably negative effects on access to healthcare, education, and work possibilities for populations that are digitally excluded; not have access to internet.

Limitations and Gaps

The article has a number of major restrictions:

Absence of research support: Kasapis discusses digital inequality in general terms without offering precise statistics on internet usage, the financial effects of digital exclusion, or case studies to support his arguments.

Limited investigation of complexity: The article oversimplifies the subject of digital rights while ignoring issues like differentiating between meaningful use, literacy, cost, and accessibility; differences in the digital sectionide between various demographic groups and geographical areas; infrastructure and technical obstacles to universal access; and economic and political obstacles to universal access implementation.

A lack of policy analysis: Although the article raises issues regarding government accountability, it ignores current policy initiatives, their efficacy, and implementation difficulties.

Western-centric viewpoint: Although the article mentions global digital sectionisions, it mostly makes assumptions about Western contexts and falls short in addressing the unique difficulties faced by developing countries.

Limited discussion of objections: The article doesn't address potential objections to framing internet access as a fundamental right or competing policy priorities.

Theoretical Context

The argument put forth by Kasapis can be placed within a broader body of research on digital differences and rights. Cerf (2012) contends that internet access should to be acknowledged as a social right, if not a human right, and his rights-based methodology supports this view. Scholars like Frosini (2013), who make a distinction between fundamental rights and the means to exercise them, disagreed with this view, arguing that internet access may be classified as the latter and not as a first option.

According to further studies, Kasapis's article's pandemic background is accurate. Research such as that conducted by van Deursen (2020) demonstrates that COVID-19 made digital inequalities worse, with underprivileged populations facing more severe difficulties as a result of restricted access to the internet. The concept of "digital-social inequality," which emphasises how digital exclusion interacts with and perpetuates other forms of social disadvantage, is another way that Zheng and Walsham (2021) expand on the subject.

In terms of the policy consequences, Kasapis's demand for government action is consistent with opinions supported by academics such as Sylvester (2019), who makes the case for internet access as an essential service. He does not, however, address the intricate implementation issues that are investigated by scholars like Pick and Sarkar (2015), who look at the various social, political, and economic aspects that affect policies for digital inclusion.

Avenues for Future Research

The article written by Kasapis lays out a number of encouraging avenues for further investigation:

Evaluation of pandemic effects through experience: Kasapis's claims might be supported or improved by longitudinal research examining the ways in which digital differences influenced economic and educational results both during and after the pandemic.

Policy effectiveness research: Comparative studies of various government strategies for guaranteeing internet access, such as universal service commitments, subsidies, public infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks.

Intersectional analysis: A more comprehensive understanding than Kasapis's purely economic framing might be obtained by looking at how digital sectionides intersect with other types of marginalisation based on variables including race, gender, disability, and geography.

Digital literacy and meaningful use: Getting past basic ideas of access to explore what meaningful digital involvement looks like and how to build the skills required for it.

Perspectives from the Global South: Kasapis' Western-centric viewpoint would be enhanced by studies focused on the particular difficulties faced by developing countries and their creative strategies for digital inclusion.

Legal and ethical frameworks: Addressing the philosophical issue that Kasapis poses but fails to address, further development of legal arguments and normative frameworks for making internet access a fundamental right.

Conclusion

In the context of the pandemic, Kasapis' article presents a relevant and ethically sound argument for internet access as a fundamental right. Its main contribution is to show how digital exclusion worsens already-existing disparities and to link internet access to well-established human rights debate. More evidence-based backing, a more nuanced study of the complexity of the digital sectionide, and a more thorough examination of the policy consequences would, still enhance the case.

Although the article is a good place to start when talking about digital rights, it has to be complemented by more thorough research that addresses implementation issues, geographical variances, and the intersectional effects of digital exclusion. Kasapis' central claim that democratic participation increasingly necessitates digital access (2020), is still relevant for future research and policy development as societies continue to digitise possibilities and critical services.